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Summary: The European Union is developing child specific indicators of well-being to complement the 
Laeken indicators on poverty and social exclusion. Though many child sensitive indicators have been 
proposed, none of the measures is sensitive to (changes in) cumulative deprivation, i.e. the degree to 
which a child simultaneously experiences a range of unfavourable conditions. 
This paper describes and empirically tests a number of candidate measures of cumulative deprivation to 
monitor child well-being. The ideal measure is sensitive to (changes in) cumulative deprivation and, given 
its broad use in the policy community, has an intuitive interpretation. Using the 2007 wave of the EU-
SILC data, we construct several headcount and adjusted-headcount measures of cumulative deprivation 
from a set of 13 deprivation indicators for Germany, France, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
We  test  the  impact  of  changes  in  the  main  methodological  decisions:  the  exclusion  of  deprivation 
indicators,  changes  in  the  indicator  threshold,  changes  in  the  cumulative  deprivation  threshold  and 
changes in the weighting indicators. Our findings indicate that some measures are considerably more 
sensitive than others. 
In  the  context  of  the  search  for  child-specific  indicators,  we  conclude  that  headcount  and  adjusted 
headcount measures of cumulative deprivation give relevant and complementary insights into child well-
being and perform well in sensitivity tests. While the interpretation of headcount measures is somewhat 
easier, the adjusted-headcount is additionally able to monitor changes in cumulative deprivation and it is 
less sensitive to changes in the methodology. Within these two broad classes some non-trivial choices 
must be made and the adjusted-headcount with a cumulative deprivation threshold of one satisfies the 
evaluation criteria best. The relative measures of cumulative deprivation are problematic: not only are 
they very sensitive to changes in methodological decisions, but they are also more difficult to interpret. 
However, to monitor cumulative deprivation of children there is also a need for child specific indicators 
(rather than household level indicators) over a wider range of well-being domains. 
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The European Union (EU) is currently in the process of developing child specific indicators of 
well-being that will be used, together with the Laeken indicators on poverty and social exclusion, 
to monitor progress towards achieving inclusive economic growth. Although a wide range of 
child sensitive indicators has been proposed in recent years, none of the measures is sensitive to 
(changes in) cumulative deprivation i.e. the degree to which a child simultaneously experiences a 
range of unfavourable conditions.
1 From a  well-being perspective, information on cumulative 
deprivation is highly relevant for any population group: if 10% of the population lives in poor 
housing conditions and an equal percentage lives in a  neighbourhood  where there is a  high 
crime/vandalism rate, persons experiencing both conditions ceteris paribus are worse off than 
persons experiencing only one condition. For children, this distinction is even more pertinent: 
children‟s current well-being is a key determinant of their future well-being; more often than not, 
well-being in one domain (e.g. health) is complementary to well-being in another domain (e.g. 
education);  and  children  also  have  little  control  over,  or  responsibility  for,  the  factors 
determining their own well-being.  
 
This paper develops and tests a range of potential candidates for national benchmark indicators 
of cumulative deprivation that can be used to monitor child well-being. Such a measure should 
satisfy two criteria. First, it should be sensitive to cumulative deprivation and changes therein. 
Second, as monitoring progress on these and other measures will be of interest to policymakers, 
researchers, politicians and other interest groups, the measure should be intuitive / relatively easy 
to interpret for a broad audience. This paper uses the 2007 wave of the EU-SILC data to estimate 
a  range  of  cumulative  deprivation  measures  including  13  deprivation  indicators  in  four  EU 
member states: Germany, France, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The behaviour of 
the measures is tested by means of various sensitivity analyses. Given the potential policy uses, 
the results are analyzed both from a European and a national perspective.  
 
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the context in which child well-being 
enters the European agenda; section 3 discusses the potential measures, their calculation and 
their theoretical properties; section 4 sets out our choices regarding the operationalisation of the 
measures;  section  5  reports  the  first  estimates  for  the  cumulative  deprivation  measures  and 
investigates  to  what  extent  cumulative  deprivation  levels  differ  between  the  cumulative 
deprivation measures but also with respect to the EU's at-risk-of-poverty estimates; in section 6 
we  re-estimate  the  cumulative  deprivation  measures  under  a  number  of  realistic  alternative 
decision scenarios and we analyze the degree to which this would change the results; section 7 
                                                 
 
1 To date, there is only one proposed child indicator measuring one aspect of cumulative deprivation: the primary 
indicator on material deprivation which is measured for the population as a whole and does also include an age 
breakdown for the population aged between 0 and 17 years (Guio, 2009; TARKI Social Research Institute, 2010); it 
measures the percentage of individuals (children) that have more than two (out of nine) deprivations. 2 
 
synthesizes the findings, points out which of the measure(s) is most promising and discusses the 
broader relevance of these findings for multidimensional poverty measurement and their use in 
the policy domain.   
 
2. CHILD WELL-BEING AND THE SOCIAL INDICATORS APPROACH 
 
In  order  to  evaluate  potential  candidates  for  an  EU  benchmark  indicator  of  cumulative 
disadvantage to monitor child well-being it is important to better understand the context in which 
child well-being enters the European agenda. In this section we therefore discuss the context in 
which  social  indicators  are  used  in  European  and  national  policy-making  and  we  document 
progress in the more recent search for child-specific indicators of poverty and social inclusion.   
 
The role of social indicators in the EU  
The Lisbon Strategy reflects the European Union's desire to be a world leading knowledge-based 
economy. This goal is to be reached through smart, inclusive and sustainable economic growth.
2 
Though an EU wide agenda since 2000, much of the implementation of those strategies occurs at 
national levels. This  holds  especially  for the  formulation,  implementation  and evaluation  of 
policies directed towards  reducing  poverty and  increasing  social inclusion.  "Since 2000, the 
European Union has provided, through the open method of coordination, a framework for 
national strategy development as well as for policy coordination between EU countries on issues 
relating to poverty and social exclusion. This coordinated action at European level is reflected in 
National  Action  Plans. It encourages EU countries to examine their policies critically, and  
highlights how some perform well in certain areas, spurring on others to perform better. It also 
creates a better basis for policy making by involving NGOs, social partners, local and regional 
authorities and those working with people in poverty."
3 
While  participation in the open method of coordination is voluntary ,  the  process  receives 
considerable attention from the policy community. This is in part because of the National Action 
Plans as well as the dissemination of common social indicators
4 on poverty and social exclusion, 
the so-called Laeken indicators, facilitate comparisons between member states. In this context, 
social indicators are used to monitor progress on the social inclusion agenda and, in some cases, 
a specific target is set. For instance, to monitor progress, the European bureau of statistics 
                                                 
 
2 European Commission. (n.d.). Lisbon strategy for growth - Towards a green and innovative economy. Retrieved 
February 2, 2011, from http://ec.europa.eu/archives/growthandjobs_2009/. 
3 European Commission. (n.d.). Employment, social affairs, and inclusion - Poverty and social exclusion. Retrieved 
February 2, 2011, from http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=751&langId=en. 
4 Indicators on poverty and social inclusion are not the only theme covered by EU social indicators; there are 
indicators covering a wider range of life domains and welfare concepts (see for instance Berger-Schmitt and Noll 
(2000)).  3 
 
(Eurostat) annually reports statistics on the number of EU residents that are "at-risk-of-poverty".
5 
However, as social cohesion is one of the pillars in Europe's 2020 strategy, an additional target is 
set to reduce the number of people that are "at -risk-of-poverty" with 20 million by 2020.
6 
Member States can additionally formulate their own national indicators; it is also their choice 
whether they set specific targets or not. 
Indicators of child well-being in the EU: an afterthought? 
When, in December 2001, the Laeken European Council adopted the first set of social indicators 
to monitor progress on poverty and social inclusion, none of the 18 indicators provided insights 
into the situation of children (European Commission, April 2003). However, the issue of child 
poverty gained in prominence during mid-2000: new research showed that in most European 
member states, families with children have a higher risk of income poverty (Hoelscher, 2004; 
Marlier, Atkinson, Cantillon, & Nolan, 2007). Moreover, following the example of the United 
Kingdom where in 1999 a commitment was made by the Blair government to eradicate child 
poverty in 20 years, child poverty increasingly became a priority on national policy agenda's 
(Marlier et al., 2007, p. 9). As a result, the importance of 'child mainstreaming' also became an 
objective of the EU agenda on poverty and social inclusion thereby also kick-starting the search 
for  indicators  of  child  well-being  (European  Commission,  2008;  Marlier  et  al.,  2007).  This 
process resulted in two types of recommendations (European Commission, 2008; TARKI Social 
Research  Institute,  2010):  calculating  age-breakdowns  for  existing  indicators  (i.e.  at-risk-of-
poverty  rates  for  children  aged  between  0-17  years)  and  developing  a  set  of  child  specific 
indicators. The search also revealed that the main source of information for poverty and social 
inclusion  indicators,  the  European  Union  Statistics  on  Income  and  Living  Conditions  (EU-
SILC), contained very little child specific information. The 2009 wave of the EU-SILC includes 
a child module; these data will soon become available, in time to incorporate the findings in the 
EU-SILC revision which is planned for 2011 (TARKI Social Research Institute, 2010).  
The proposed child indicators are the product of a recent study performed by TARKI Social 
Research Institute (2010) and comprise indicators from various data sources over a range of 
well-being  domains  varying  from  monetary  poverty  to  material  deprivation,  housing, 
employment  of  parents,  education,  health,  exposure  to  risk  and  risk  behaviour,  social 
participation  and  family  relations,  and  local  environment.  A  few  composite  indicators, 
combining information from various single indicators for each child, are included. In the domain 
of material deprivation, the authors suggest a child specific age-breakdown (ages 0 to 17) of the 
'primary indicator of material deprivation' as developed by Guio (2009). Using the EU-SILC 
data, this indicator is calculated as the percentage of children missing at least three out of nine 
                                                 
 
5 In fact, Eurostat also publishes poverty rates for non-EU countries such as Iceland, Switzerland and Turkey. 




7  that  are  considered  to  be  socially  recognized  necessiti es  (TARKI  Social  Research 
Institute, 2010, Annex 3.5, p. 30). It should be noted that the items in the primary indicator are 
not child specific.  In that same domain, but using the PISA data,  another proposed  index 
measures  the percentage of children that have low educational resources at home including 
resources such as parent's education, books, a computer, access to newspapers and a study desk.       
An interesting feature of the European discussion on child indicators is the strong emphasis put 
on 'investment' in children's  future well-being (Marlier et al., 2007; TARKI Social Research 
Institute, 2010, Annex 3.5). Though it is acknowledged that a child relevant perspective requires 
a multidimensional approach to well-being, the rationale for developing such indicators, as well 
as the  proposed indicators,  seems to  focus on 'red flags' threatening  children's future social 
inclusion as adults, their cognitive development and factors contributing to the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty. Less attention is paid to children's current well -being including their 
contemporary social inclusion. In light of the Lisbon agenda, which focuses on a competitive and 
inclusive  future  Europe ,  the  emphasis  on  investment  makes  sense.  However,  this 
operationalisation of child well -being in the EU implicitly implies that less importance is 
attributed to childhood as a state in and of itself  (Ben-Arieh, 2000; Duncan & Brooks-Gunn, 
1997; Fattore, Mason, & Watson, 2007; Moore, Lippman, & Brown, 2004; Qvortrup, 1997; 
Streeten, 1984, for a more elaborate discussion see Notten & Roelen, November 2010). 
Concluding, it took a bit longer before the need for child-specific indicators in EU's portfolio of 
social indicators was recognized, but this has changed: the calculation of child sensitive age -
breakdowns of social indicators has already been adopted and a range of child-specific indicators 
has recently been proposed (TARKI Social Research Institute, 2010). While the EU approach to 
child well-being is multidimensional, it emphasizes the investment  aspect of children's welfare 
rather than children's current well-being. One of the indicators, the so-called primary indicator on 
material deprivation already reflects one aspect of cumulative deprivation, namely the percentage 
of children that lack more  than two necessities.  Limitations of this indicator are   that  i)  the 
indicator does not include child specific items and ii ) it only covers  one domain of children's 
well-being. In the next section we discuss the calculation and properties of a range of potential 
measures of cumulative deprivation , including the class of measures to which the primary 
indicator on material deprivation belongs. 
                                                 
 
7 The nine items are 1) arrears on mortgage or rent payments, utility bills, hire purchase instalments or other loan 
payments; 2) capacity to afford paying for one week's annual holiday away from home; 3) capacity to afford a meal 
with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; 4) capacity to face unexpected financial 
expenses; 5) household cannot afford a telephone; 6) household cannot afford a colour TV; 7) household cannot 
afford a washing machine; 8) household cannot afford a car and 9) ability of the household to pay for keeping its 
home adequately warm. 5 
 
3. MEASURES OF CUMULATIVE DEPRIVATION 
 
In our search for an appropriate measure of cumulative deprivation experienced by children in 
EU member states, this section discusses a number of potential candidates from a theoretical 
measurement perspective focusing on the following questions: How is the measure computed, 
what desirable properties does it (not) have and how does it compare with the other measures of 
poverty and social exclusion that are used in the EU context? As stated in the introduction, the 
measure should meet the following requirements: it should be sensitive to cumulative deprivation 
and changes therein, and it should have an intuitive interpretation.
8    
 
We start by defining the key terms used in this section.  When a child's well-being in a specific 
aspect of well-being falls below a minimum, the child is considered deprived. This minimum is a 
so-called deprivation threshold; it is inspired by prevailing standards in the society in which the 
child resides. Furthermore, cumulative deprivation occurs when a child suffers from multiple 
deprivations at the same time; it thus reflects the breadth of deprivation at an individual level. A 
cumulative deprivation threshold expresses the minimum number of deprivations a child needs 
to have in order to be considered as cumulatively deprived. Finally, a cumulative deprivation 
measure is an aggregate index that provides a specific insight into the extent of cumulative 
deprivation as experienced by children in a given society.  
 
This section will focus on children as the unit of analysis; we further assume that all indicators 
of  deprivation  are  available  for  every  country  and  every  child  population  subgroup;  this 
eliminates one potential source of variation in the measure between countries and subgroups.  
 
The measures discussed below fall into two subgroups: headcounts and so-called deprivation-
adjusted  headcounts.  Whereas  the  estimates  in  the  first  group  can  be  interpreted  as  the 
percentage of cumulatively deprived persons in a population the estimates of the second group 
reflect  the  average  percentage  of  deprivations  experienced  by  a  population.  The  other 
distinguishing characteristic between measures is whether the cumulative deprivation threshold 
depends on the distribution of deprivations in a society (i.e. whether it is relative) or not.    
 
Cumulative Deprivation Headcount (CDH) 
  
Analogous  to  the  popular  poverty  headcount  index,  the  CDH  measures  the  number  of 
cumulatively  deprived  children  as  a  percentage  of  the  child  population  (Foster,  Greer  and 
Thorbecke, 1984). Firstly, one calculates the breadth of deprivations at the level of the child: 
                                                 
 
8 In the next sections, when we construct and test the measures, we need to add another binding requirement; namely 
that the measure can be calculated from existing data. 6 
 
(CDi) which is expressed at the ratio of the number of observed indicator deprivations over the 
maximum number of possible indicator deprivations: 
 
      
∑   
 
   
      (1) 
 
where    represents a dichotomous variable with value 1 if the child is below the deprivation 
indicator threshold (zi) and thus deprived, and value of 0 if the child meets the threshold and is 
not deprived. A deprivation indicator is denoted with d and D represents the total number of 
possible deprivation indicators. A non-deprived child will have a value of CDi = 0 while a child 
deprived in all indicators will have a value of CDi = 1. 
 
Secondly, to identify whether the individual is cumulatively deprived, the degree of individual 
cumulative deprivation (CDi) needs to be compared with a cumulative deprivation threshold 
(zcd);  only  children  with  a  number  of  deprivations  above  this  threshold  are  considered 
cumulatively deprived (q). The value of zcd is expressed as a fraction of the maximum possible 
amount of deprivations (D); zcd can thus vary from 1/ D to 1.
9 The Cumulative Deprivation 
Headcount can then be calculated as: 
 
     
∑         
   
                     (2) 
 
where  the  numerator  represents  the  sum  of  cumulatively  deprived  individuals  and  the 
denominator, N, the total child population. The EU 'primary indicator of material deprivation' 
belongs  to  this  class;  the  cumulative  deprivation  threshold  is  set  at  3  (out  of  9)  material 
deprivations (Guio, 2009). 
 
The CDH is has a clear intuitive interpretation but the drawback is that it is not sensitive to 
changes in the number of deprivations experienced by a child; if a child becomes deprived in one 
more domain, the index does not change. In other words, the measure does not satisfy the axiom 
of dimensional monotonicity (Alkire and Foster, May 2008).   
 
Cumulative Deprivation Index (CDI)  
 
Rather than counting the percentage of cumulatively deprived children, the next measure, the 
CDI, counts deprivations of cumulatively deprived children.
10 The breadth of individual level 
                                                 
 
9 Though, strictly speaking, to be cumulatively deprived one would only have to count children with at least two 
deprivations. 
10 This measure is also known as the dimension adjusted headcount (M0) and has been introduced in a unified 
framework by Alkire and Foster (February 2007). 7 
 
deprivations (   ) is aggregated over q cumulatively deprived children and averaged over the 
total child population (N): 
 
     
∑         
   
                     (3) 
 
In case the cumulative threshold (zcd) is 1/D meaning that also children with a single deprivation 
are included, the interpretation of the CDI is straightforward: a  value of 0.2 means that, on 
average, children are deprived in 20% of deprivation indicators. When the cumulative threshold 
is set at a higher number of deprivations, individuals with fewer deprivations than the threshold, 
though included in the denominator will no longer be included in the numerator. This comes at a 
loss  of  intuitive  interpretation;  the  resulting  number  will  show  the  number  of  deprivations 
suffered by the cumulatively poor averaged over the total population.  
 
A slightly different perspective would be provided by the CDI of the cumulative poor; rather 
than dividing by the total population we divide by the poor population (q):  
 
          
∑         
   
                     (4) 
 
The advantage is that the CDI of the poor focuses only on the poor population and thus the 
resulting index will represent the average percentage of deprivations experienced by the poor. A 
problem with this measure, however, is that it could deteriorate while the overall level of well-
being in society increases: if, for instance, the person closest under the cumulative poverty line 
escapes from poverty, ceteris paribus, the CDI of the cumulative poor will deteriorate while one 
person's well-being improved. 
 
In all cases the CDI and the CDI of the poor measures satisfy dimensional monotonicity; if a 
cumulatively deprived child becomes deprived in one more domain, the index deteriorates. 
 
Relative Cumulative Deprivation Threshold (RCDH, RCDI) 
 
Monitoring poverty and social exclusion in a European Union context automatically involves 
taking a cross-national comparative perspective. If one were to approach cumulative deprivation 
as an indicator of social exclusion, one might object that the CDH and CDI are not sensitive to 
the „normal‟ level of deprivations in the benchmark society. From a relative perspective, can a 
person who is deprived in two indicators be considered socially excluded if being deprived in 
two indicators is rather common in that society? Given that indicator deprivation rates in Greece 
are much higher than those in The Netherlands, is a Greek child less disadvantaged vis-à-vis its 
Greek peers than its Dutch counterpart if both live in a household that is not able to afford an 
annual one-week vacation? An affirmative answer to this question implies that a measure of 
cumulative deprivation should also take typical deprivation levels of a country into account. A 8 
 
straightforward  way  to  do  this  is  to  follow  standard  practise  in  relative  income  poverty 
measurement: the cumulative deprivation threshold (    ) is now set relative to the median or 
average (fraction of) deprivations in the child population ( ):  
 
                   (5) 
 
where k typically reflects a value between zero and one. For instance, if the median or average 
number of deprivations in a population is two out of a total of D deprivations ( =2/D) and k is 
set at 0.5, the relative cumulative deprivation threshold is set at 3/D; hence children with three or 
more deprivations are in cumulative deprivation. 
 
One can use      to compute the relative counterparts of the CDH and CDI.
11 Essentially, these 
relative measures compare the cumulative disadvantage of a child relative to that of her peers. A 
drawback of this class of measures is that the so -called focus axiom is not satisfied: this axiom 
states that changes in the non-poor population should not affect the measure. However, relative 
measures by definition also take the non -poor population into account:  as the distribution of 
deprivations is used to establish the relative cumulative threshold (    ), changes in the number 
of  non-cumulatively  deprived  distribution  can  affect  the  threshold  and  thus  the  relative 
cumulative  deprivation  measure.  In  line  with  the  CDI,  RCDI  is  sensitive  to  changes  in  the 
breadth of deprivations.  
 
Concluding, the measures discussed fall into two broad categories: headcount indices (counting 
the percentage of cumulatively deprived persons) and cumulative deprivation indices (measuring 
the  breadth  of  deprivations).  A  further  distinguishing  characteristic  is  that  the  cumulative 
deprivation threshold could be set in a relative manner i.e. the relative cumulative deprivation 
threshold depends on the typical breadth of deprivations in society. The overview in Table 1 
summarizes  whether  each  of  the  measures  discussed  has  the  desired  properties:  only  two 
variations of the CDI measure satisfy both properties. On the other hand, the relative measures 
seem to fit well in an EU poverty and social exclusion indicators context. Whereas the other 
measures  allow  making  cross-national  comparisons  regarding  the  (absolute)  degree  of 
cumulative deprivation among common indicators (i.e. reflecting a common threshold across the 
EU), the RCDH allows for a cross-national comparison in the degree  of relative cumulative 
deprivation (i.e. respecting national differences between levels of cumulative deprivation). The 





                                                 
 
11 In our calculations in sections 4 and 5 the value of k is set at 0.5 of the median fraction of deprivations. 9 
 
Table 1: Comparison properties of cumulative deprivation measures 
  Intuitive interpretation  Sensitive  to  changes  in  the  breadth  of 
deprivations of the cumulatively deprived 
CDH  Yes  No 
CDI if zcd=1/D  Yes  Yes 
CDI if zcd>1/D  No  Yes 
CDI of the poor  Yes  Yes 
RCDH  Yes  No 




To operationalise the above-discussed cumulative deprivation in the context of child well-being 
in the European Union, a range of choices has to be made, each of which will influence the 
estimates. Evidently, the availability of data represents a key constraint in this process. In our 
view, the empirical implementation as presented below reflects a reasonably good starting point 
but one that can certainly be improved when more data become available. In this section we 




To measure cumulative deprivation at an individual level it is necessary to have the information 
on  all  indicators  available  in  a  single  dataset.  Furthermore,  the  information  needs  to  be 
comparable between EU member states. We therefore chose to work with the EU Community 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data. These data have been collected in 
the EU member states since 2004; we work with the 2007 wave as this was the most recent 
available  at  the  beginning  of  the  research  project.  The  EU-SILC  data  provide  both  cross-
sectional and longitudinal information on a range of indicators; they are the source of many EU 
social indicators. 
 
We focus our analysis on a subgroup of four member states (Germany, France, The Netherlands 
and  the  United  Kingdom)  for  two  practical  reasons.  Firstly,  an  analysis  with  all  available 
countries is rather time consuming and, to understand the behaviour of the measures, we do not 
need the full sample. Secondly, the EU-SILC data are constructed ex post by harmonizing the 
information from the multi-purpose national surveys that feed into the EU-SILC; differences 
between variables across countries may arise due to differences in the formulation of questions 
and data collection processes in general. We want to minimize this potential source of variation; 
our selection of countries is thus based on a comparison of the questionnaires and the analysis of 
descriptive statistics for our (pre)selection of indicators. The selected countries have comparable 
living standards. Nevertheless, they are different in terms of their demographics, the economy 10 
 
and  labour market,  social  policies and tax systems  (e.g. Whelan  and  Maître, 2010;  Whelan, 
Nolan and Maître, June 2008). It is thus reasonable to expect that such differences will lead to 
sufficient  variation  in  child  well-being  outcomes  to  test  the  empirical  behaviour  of  the 
cumulative deprivation measures.     
 
Indicators, thresholds and domains 
 
Table  2  lists  the  selected  indicators  within  their  respective  domains  (for  a  more  elaborate 
discussion see Notten and Roelen, November 2010, p. 10-15). Our selection of indicators has 
been guided conceptually by the acknowledgement that child well-being is multidimensional, 
that it incorporates a child's current well-being in addition to her well-becoming and that a single 
indicator can reflect  aspects  of well-being  and  well-becoming at  the same time  (for a more 
elaborate discussion see Notten and Roelen, November 2010, p. 8-10). For instance, when a 
child lives in a family that cannot afford a computer s/he might be affected in several ways. 
Firstly,  access  to  a  key  resource  used  in  social  interactions  with  peers  is  (more)  difficult. 
Secondly, s/he has fewer opportunities to gain proficiency in using computers and their software.  
 
Table 2: Deprivation indicators: definitions 
Housing  Dwelling has leaking roof, damp walls/floors/foundation, or rot in window 
frames or floor 
  Dwelling is not comfortably warm during winter time 
  Dwelling is overcrowded (threshold: see notes under this table) 
Neighbourhood  Pollution, grime or other environmental problems 
  Crime/violence or vandalism in the area 
Basic services  Access to primary health care services (threshold: some/great difficulty) 
  Access to compulsory school (threshold: some/great difficulty) 
Financial resources  Household  has  payment  arrears  on  mortgage/rent,  utility  bills, 
instalments/loan payments 
  Household  cannot  afford  meal  with  meat,  chicken,  fish,  vegetarian 
equivalent every 2
nd day 
  Household cannot afford one week annual holiday away from home 
  Household cannot afford a computer for financial reasons 
  Household cannot afford a car for financial reasons 
  Ability to make ends meet (threshold: with difficulty or great difficulty) 
Note: Most indicators come from the household data (H-file) of the 2007 wave of the EU-SILC; three indicators 
(dwelling is not comfortably warm during winter time, accessibility of primary health care services and compulsory 
school) have been retrieved from the 2007 module on housing conditions.  The threshold for the overcrowding 
indicator is based upon the number of rooms in the dwelling and the age, number of and relationships between 
household members (following TARKI Social Research Institute, 2010). 
 
Without further information, the exact nature of the relationship between these two aspects of 
well-being  cannot  be  established.  Our  selection  has  further  been  guided  by  normative 11 
 
considerations and the principle of universality. Firstly, as deprivation indicators are inherently 
normative,  "an  indicator  should  identify  the  essence  of  the  problem  and  have  a  clear  and 
accepted normative interpretation" (Atkinson et al., 2002, p. 21).
12 Secondly, the principle of 
universality implies that the indicators should be relevant across our sub -group of EU member 
states (Ruggeri Laderchi, Saith, Stewart, 2003, p. 244). 
 
Confirming the lack of child specific indicators as discussed  in section 2, we find  that the EU-
SILC only covers a limited number of the pieces that one would ideally want to include in a 
multidimensional analysis of child deprivation. While there is  a fair amount of information on 
the  physical  environment  and  material  and  financial  resources,  information  in  well -being 
domains such as health, education, leisure and relationships is much more limited or  is not 
collected at all. We found no appropriate child specific indicators; all indicators are measured at 
the household level. This, however, does not mean that they are not relevant indicators of child 
well-being  (Gordon et al, 2003)  but it implies that we have to assume that h ousehold level 
conditions affect all individuals living in the household, including children.
13 
 
In an ideal world, the choices of domains, indicators and thresholds represent separate and 
consecutive methodological steps that researchers take when constructing a multidimensional 
poverty measure (Alkire and Santos, 2009). However, the practice of working with secondary 
data means that these choices are highly interdependent; particularly when the information is 
stored in ordinal variables. For instance, respondents to the survey question “[Can] the household 
afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day” reflects a 
possible outcome that could result from insufficient financial means (European Commission, 
March 2009). Respondents can either answer the question with “yes”, “no” or they can refuse to 
answer. In the extreme, this implies that the choice on whether or not to include this information 
means that one considers all three methodological steps simultaneously: the choice of domain 
(financial resources); the choice of indicator (capacity to afford meat, chicken or fish) and the 
choice of threshold (deprived if household responds affirmatively; deprivation in the sense of 
financial strain). For nine of our indicators the question was formulated in this way. With three 
indicators there were several options for setting the deprivation threshold; our sensitivity analysis 
in section 5 will test the impact of that decision on the cumulative deprivation measures. 
We grouped the deprivation indicators into four domains: housing conditions, neighbourhood 
conditions, access to basic services and financial means. The demarcation was obtained through 
                                                 
 
12 The 2007 Eurobarometer survey on Poverty and Social Exclusion aimed at assessing which items European 
citizens deem as social necessities (Dickes, Fusco, Marlier, 2008). Many of the indicators in Table 2 are perceived 
as social necessities by 50% or more of the respondents. A computer was only seen as a social necessity by 38%, 
varying between 20-26% for our subgroup but we believe that this item has increased in importance over the past 4 
years, particularly for families with children. The survey also included social necessities that we chose not to include 
because very few, if any, households in our sample were deprived of it (i.e. fridge, washing machine). Finally, two 
indicators - access to basic services and ability to make ends meet - were not represented in the Eurobarometer.   
13 Of course, the ways and degree to which those conditions affect individual members of the household can differ 
but this information problem cannot be resolved with these data.  12 
 
an intuitive grouping of indicators rather than the identification of latent domains of poverty 
using tools such as factor analysis or latent class modelling (see Dewilde, 2004; Whelan et al., 
2001). This tension between “[…] the power of sophisticated methods […] and the transparency 
required to serve the needs of policy-makers and inform public debate” has been acknowledged 
in  the  literature  (Nolan  and  Whelan,  2010).  Given  the  aim  of  this  paper,  we  opted  for  the 





Table 3 below lists the sample statistics for the selected countries; the analysis in this paper 
focuses on the children aged 0 to 17 years and the characteristics of the households in which they 
live.  
 
Table 3: Sample size 
15 
   DE  FR  NL  UK 
   total   total   total   total  
households  14,153  10,498  10,219  9,275 
individuals  31,709  25,907  25,905  21,942 
children 0-17  6,185  6,314  6,948  4,927 
Source: authors‟ calculations with EU-SILC, wave 2007. 
 
Table 4 summarizes the indicator deprivation rates and their confidence intervals. Deprivation 
rates differ considerably across indicators: indicators referring to the affordability of a holiday, 
the experience of pollution or environmental problems and the presence of leaks or damp in the 
house display relatively high deprivation rates (13-32 per cent) while indicators referring to the 
affordability of assets such as a computer or car are considerably lower (2-7 per cent).
16    
                                                 
 
14 While the indicators used in this study show considerable overlap with those used in other European studies, the 
definition of domains differs among studies (Bradshaw and Richardson, 2009; Dewilde, 2004; Whelan et al. 2001). 
DeWilde (2004) has similar indicators in financial strain domain but her latent variable analysis for the UK and 
Belgium (1994-1999 panels) suggests that these indicators should be divided over two domains which she labels as 
'limited financial means' and 'financial stress'. Using factor analysis, Whelan, Layte, Maître and Nolan, (2001, p. 
361) find five domains that seem to work for all countries in the European Community Household Panel (1994-
2000). Their two lifestyle domains overlap with our financial strain domain and the authors sometimes also group 
both domains in one. Their environment domain overlaps with our neighborhood domain while our housing 
indicators are spread between their housing and environment domain. Bradshaw and Richardson (2009) use in part 
the same indicators and data as this article (in addition to other data sources). These authors group monetary 
poverty, economic strain and lack of consumer durables in one 'material domain'. They also group the housing and 
neighbourhood indicators in one domain (labeled 'housing and environment'). 
15 Germany joined the EU-SILC data in the 2005 round. Ex-post quality comparisons between the 2005 rounds of 
Microcensus, GSOEP and EU-SILC data suggest that population groups such as very young children (age 0-4), 
those with low education levels and certain groups of foreign residents, are under-represented in the EU-SILC 
(Hauser, 2008). Currently it is not clear to what extent these issues have been resolved in the 2007 survey round.  
16 Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix summarize the pair wise correlations between the indicators: higher positive 
correlations are a first indication of a higher likelihood of double deprivation. 13 
 
Table 4: Indicator deprivation rates, children age 0-17 [confidence intervals] 
  DE  FR  NL  UK 
  %  %  %  % 
Housing problems         
leaks/damp present in house   16.1  15.7  20.1  17.3 
  [14.7,17.6]  [14.2,17.4]  [18.2,22.2]  [15.5,19.2] 
unable to keep house warm  6.4  4.6  1.9  5.2 
  [5.5,7.4]  [3.8,5.5]  [1.2,3.0]  [4.0,6.6] 
overcrowding  9.1  14.9  4.7  12.0 
  [7.9,10.4]  [13.2,16.9]  [3.6,6.2]  [10.3,13.9] 
Neighbourhood problems             
experienced pollution/environmental 
problems  20.9  15.4  13.4  13.1 
  [19.3,22.5]  [13.6,17.4]  [11.9,15.0]  [11.6,14.6] 
experienced crime/violence/vandalism  12.3  15.5  17.7  28.3 
  [11.1,13.7]  [13.9,17.3]  [16.1,19.5]  [26.3,30.4] 
Difficult access to basic services             
difficult to access primary health care  12.5  7.6  8.8  4.7 
  [11.2,13.9]  [6.5,8.9]  [7.7,10.1]  [3.7,5.8] 
difficult to access compulsory school  16.4  6.8  7.2  8.1 
  [15.0,17.9]  [5.8,7.9]  [5.9,8.7]  [6.8,9.7] 
Financial strain             
combined arrears indicator  7.7  12.9  5.1  14.0 
  [6.7,8.9]  [11.4,14.4]  [4.1,6.4]  [12.3,15.9] 
not able to afford holiday  30.1  32.5  13.7  30.4 
  [28.2,31.9]  [30.5,34.6]  [11.9,15.9]  [28.2,32.7] 
 cannot afford meat etc. every second day  11.2  6.4  1.1  4.8 
  [9.9,12.5]  [5.4,7.6]  [0.8,1.6]  [3.8,6.0] 
 cannot afford a  computer  2.2  7.0  0.6  5.5 
  [1.7,2.8]  [6.0,8.1]  [0.2,1.6]  [4.5,6.7] 
 cannot afford a car  4.1  3.5  4.6  6.7 
  [3.4,4.8]  [2.7,4.6]  [3.4,6.2]  [5.5,8.3] 
 difficult to make ends meet  6.7  20.3  12.1  20.2 
  [5.8,7.7]  [18.5,22.2]  [10.4,14.2]  [18.3,22.3] 
Number of households  14,153  10,498  10,219  9,275 
Number of children (age 0-17)  6,185  6,314  6,948  4,927 






Overall, indicator deprivation rates tend to be lower in the Netherlands but they can differ quite 
considerably across countries. For example, whilst the UK presents the highest crime deprivation 
rates (28 per cent) and the lowest deprivation rate with respect to pollution (13 per cent), this 
picture is completely opposite for Germany (12 versus 21 per cent). Furthermore, the problem of 
being unable to afford a holiday is almost twice as high as crime deprivation in Germany and 
France, whilst crime is perceived as a greater problem in the Netherlands than the ability to 
afford a holiday. In sum, results at an indicator level point towards a diverse picture of child 
deprivation across indicators; one cannot identify indicators that display consistently high or low 
deprivation rates across all countries
17 and one cannot rank countries consistently on the basis of 
their performance with respect to the different indicators (see  Roelen and Notten (2011) for an 
elaborate analysis and discussion of child poverty at a domain level). 
 
Table 5: Distribution of indicator deprivations, as a percentage share of children age 0-17 
Number of deprivations  DE  FR  NL  UK 
0  34.0  34.8  42.8  31.4 
1  25.2  25.0  29.8  26.9 
2  17.9  14.9  14.1  15.0 
3  10.2  10.1  6.4  11.1 
4  6.2  5.9  3.8  6.1 
5  3.1  4.6  1.6  4.5 
6  1.7  2.5  0.9  2.8 
7  0.8  1.2  0.4  1.3 
8  0.4  0.6  0.1  0.7 
9  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2 
10  0.2  0.1  0  0 
11  0  0.1  0  0 
12  0  0  0  0 
13  0  0  0  0 
Total  100 %  100 %  100 %  100 % 
         
Relative Cumulative Threshold  
(1.5  times  the  median  number 
of indicator deprivations) 
1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5 
Source: authors‟ calculations with EU-SILC, wave 2007. Estimates take account of the survey sampling design. 
 
Table 5 provides some first insights into the degree of cumulative deprivation experienced by 
children in these EU member states: about three in every ten of the French, German and British 
children are not deprived in any of the indicators; for Dutch children this is about four in every 
                                                 
 
17 Indicator deprivation rates can also show a clear trend over time; home computers, for example, have become 
more affordable in quite a short period of time. 15 
 
ten. On the flip side this means that it is quite common for children to live in households that are 
deprived in one or more indicators. The largest share of children is deprived according to a single 
indicator  (ranging  from  25-29%)  but  the  shares  of  double  and  triple  deprivation  are  still 
considerable (ranging from six to 18%). Less than five per cent of children live in households 
suffering from 6 or more deprivations. 
 
From  the  table  it  is  also  relatively  easy  to  see  what  the  levels  of  Cumulative  Deprivation 
Headcount (CDH) would be: for a cumulative deprivation threshold of one, respectively 68.6%, 
65.2%, 66.0% and 57.2% of British, French, German and Dutch children would be cumulatively 
deprived. Not surprisingly, cumulative deprivation rates drop considerably as the cumulative 
deprivation threshold increases.  
 
Moreover,  the  deprivation  distribution  is  also  the  reference  for  establishing  the  relative 
cumulative deprivation threshold. In this study we focus on the median number of deprivations 
(i.e. the number of deprivation experienced by the 50
th percentile of the population): for all 
countries  this  coincides  with  a  single  deprivation.  For  the  purpose  of  this  study  we  set  the 
cumulative deprivation threshold at 50 per cent of the median (thus 1.5 deprivations); as the 
deprivation  counts  only  integers  this  effectively  this  means  that  children  with  two  or  more 
deprivations are counted as relative cumulative deprived. We choose 50% of the median as this 
closely corresponds to the relative threshold of the EU at-risk-of-poverty indicators which is set 
at 60 per cent.
18  
 
Aggregation to cumulative deprivation measures: weights 
 
All the cumulative deprivation measures discussed in this paper are so-called composite indices 
meaning that they are constructed using more than one indicator. In the aggregation process, the 
construction of a composite index faces more decisions regarding weights than single indicator 
indices.  Whereas  a  single  indicator  index  only  requires  choosing  whether  shortfalls  to  the 
threshold are weighed equally or not, a composite indicator additionally faces choices regarding 
the weight of indicators and domains of well-being. In all cases the choice will influence the 
estimates of the composite index.   
 
Given the structure of our data, (most of) our deprivation indicators are binominal (i.e. one if 
deprived and zero if not deprived) implying that, for a given indicator, each deprived person will 
have an equal weight even though there might be differences in the degree to which they are 
deprived (but unfortunately this is not registered in the data). We can, however, choose in what 
way we weigh the indicators and domains. The range of weighting options is well summarized 
and compared in a recent working paper by DeCancq and Lugo (August 2010), and Guio (2009, 
                                                 
 
18 Unless the median number of deprivations is 10, the cumulative deprivation thresholds will be the same with a 
50% or 60% threshold. 16 
 
section 4, pp. 13-24) tests three of those methods on two EU indicators of material deprivation: 
equal weights, frequency-based weights and stated preferences weights. The first method is a 
normative method in the sense that the researcher decides on the relative importance of each 
indicator  and  dimension;  the  equal  weights  option  is  a  popular  method  reflecting  the  value 
judgement that each indicator is equally important. The frequency weights method is a data-
driven method, the indicator receives a lower weight (typically the inverse of the deprivation 
rate) if many people are deprived in that item and a higher weight if only a few are deprived. 
This method implicitly makes the value judgement that deprivation is judged from a relative 
perspective; it is worse to be deprived if most people are not. The stated preferences weights are 
determined by prevailing norms in society as typically measured by opinion surveys such as the 
Eurobarometer; items that are valued more highly by the average population get a higher weight 
than those that are less valued. As four of our indicators do not feature in the Eurobarometer, we 
cannot test the stated preferences weights but we can test the frequency weight method. Our 
primary choice though is the equal weights method simply because the interpretation of the 
estimates is more intuitive. 
 
However, even when using the equal weight method we have to choose whether we want to put 
an equal weight on every indicator or on every domain; unless one has an equal amount of 
indicators in each domain this is not a trivial choice. In their recent study comparing a new 
multidimensional poverty index for 104 developing countries, Alkire and Santos (July 2010, p. 
17) use equal weights (33.3%) for every domain (education, health, standard of living) and, 
consequently,  different  relative  weights  for  the  deprivation  indicators  within  those  domains 
(varying from 5.6% to 16.7%). While this approach is preferable with such distinct and relevant 
domains  of  well-being,  we  do  not  think  that  would  be  appropriate  in  our  case:  there  is 
considerably less agreement about the demarcation of the domains for our selection of indicators 
(see the discussion in footnote 14) and, as we already acknowledged, from a multidimensional 
child  well-being  perspective  many  relevant  domains  are  not  covered  by  the  data  (they  thus 
implicitly have a weight of zero in our index). We therefore use equal indicator weights as our 
default.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that even when equal weights are specified, indicators with higher 
deprivation rates will have a larger contribution to the composite index (Alkire & Santos, July 
2010). As can be seen in Table 4 above, quite some families cannot afford a one week vacation 
but  only  few families  cannot  afford  a computer; the contribution of the  holiday deprivation 
indicator to the cumulative deprivation estimate will thus be higher. It is therefore important to 





5. CUMULATIVE DEPRIVATION MEASURES:  
BENCHMARK ESTIMATES 
 
This section reports the first round of estimates for the cumulative deprivation measures and 
investigates to what extent the level of cumulative deprivation differs between the cumulative 
deprivation  measures  but  also  with  respect  to  the  EU's  at-risk-of-poverty  estimates  (income 
poverty). As estimates such as these are used for both national and international comparative 
purposes, we briefly comment on within and between country differences as well as differences 
between  different  groups  of  children.  In  the  next  section,  these  estimates  will  serve  as  a 
benchmark for comparison in the sensitivity tests. 
 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative deprivation measures and income poverty 
 
Source: authors‟ calculations with EU-SILC, wave 2007. Estimates take account of the survey sampling design. 
 
The  measures  in  Figure  1  can  be  divided  into  two  subgroups:  headcounts  and  deprivation-
adjusted  headcounts.  The  Income  Poverty  and  Relative  Cumulative  Deprivation  Headcount 



































Cumulative Deprivation Measures18 
 
(RCDH) measures reflect the percentage of children that are respectively living in income poor
19 
or cumulatively deprived households. As explained in the previous section (see also Table 5), the 
RCDH includes a child as relatively cumulatively deprived if s/he lives in a family that has 50% 
more deprivations that of the median child; for all the countries in this paper this is when a child 
suffers from two or more deprivations. The higher scores of the RCDH suggest that cumulative 
deprivation is a much more common phenomenon in our societies than income poverty: 28% for 
the Netherlands and 40 -42% for Germany, France and the United Kingdom while income 
poverty rates differ respectively from 14 to 23%. This means that a considerable group of 
cumulatively deprived children must be part of a household that has an income above the poverty 
line; in spite of this, the resources do not suffice to prevent cumulative deprivation. In Roelen 
and Notten  (2011)  this overlap  between monetary poverty and non -monetary dimensions of 
deprivation is further analyzed; the study not only confirms the above result but it also shows 
that part of the income poor households are not deprived in non-monetary dimensions. 
 
The headcount measures do not provide any insights into the depth and breadth of poverty and 
deprivation  while  all  three  Cumulative  Deprivation  Indices  in  Figure  1  take  the  breadth  of 
deprivations into account (but not the depth). The Cumulative Deprivation Index (CDI) counts 
every deprivation of every child and thus also includes single deprived children; the estimate 
reflects the average percentage of deprivations experienced by all the children. As our analysis 
includes 13 deprivation indicators, a score of 0.077 means that children, on average, experience 
one deprivation (1/13=0.077); a score of 0.154 indicates an average of two deprivations. The 
CDI's of the countries in this paper lie in between these two scores: 0.085 for the Netherlands, 
0.120 for Germany, 0.126 for France and 0.131 for the United Kingdom. The CDI of the poor 
also  counts  every  deprivation  of  every  child  but  rather  than  including  all  children  in  the 
denominator it shows the average percentage of deprivations as experienced by poor children. 
This explains why the scores of the CDI of the poor are higher than those of the CDI: the CDI of 
the poor ranges from 0.15 in the Netherlands to 0.18-0.19 in Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom. Thus, on average, poor children experience two deprivations. The Relative CDI only 
counts every deprivation if a child lives in a household experiencing 50% more deprivation than 
the median household. As a group of deprived children is then excluded, the resulting scores of 
the RCDI are lower than those of the CDI and the CDI of the poor: they range from 0.06 in the 
Netherlands to 0.10-0.11 in the other three countries. Given this exclusion, the RDCI looses the 
intuitive (average) interpretation of the other two CDI measures. 
                                                 
 
19 A household and all its individuals is income poor if its adult equivalent income is less than 60% of the national 
median income. It should also be noted that while the relative deprivation threshold is determined on the basis of 
what is observed for households with children, the income poverty threshold is calculated according to the median 
income  of  the  overall  population,  i.e.  also  including  households  without  children.  This  has  implications  if 
households with children are dissimilar from the median household in the population as a whole. For instance if 
households with children have a higher median number of deprivation the relative threshold will be higher than for 




Taking  an  international  comparative  perspective,  the  Netherlands  has  the  lowest  level  of 
cumulative deprivation according to all indices and it has the lowest income poverty rate. When 
moving from Germany to France and the United Kingdom, cumulative deprivation levels and 
income  poverty  increase  without  any  reversal  of  the  ranking  in  countries.  Even  though  the 
United  Kingdom  performs  worst  according  to  all  measures  (in  comparison  to  the  other 
countries), it performs much worse in income poverty and less badly in cumulative deprivation. 
Though we do not further investigate the underlying reason for this result, a potential explanation 
could be that despite the larger dispersion of the (adult equivalent) income distribution, British 
households with children have enough access to (public and financial) resources to prevent a 
concurrent level of deprivations. 20 
 
Figure 2: Poverty profile Germany 
 
Source: authors‟ calculations with EU-SILC, wave 2007. Estimates take account of the survey sampling design.    

























































Figure 3: Poverty profile France 
 
Source: authors‟ calculations with EU-SILC, wave 2007. Estimates take account of the survey sampling design.    

























































Figure 4: Poverty profile The Netherlands 
 
Source: authors‟ calculations with EU-SILC, wave 2007. Estimates take account of the survey sampling design. 
 

























































Figure 5: Poverty profile United Kingdom 
 
Source: authors‟ calculations with EU-SILC, wave 2007. Estimates take account of the survey sampling design

























































Figures 2 to 5 compare the national scores to those of subgroups in the population. Rather than 
an in depth exploration of the characteristics associated with a high or low risk of cumulative 
deprivation, this paper aims to test and compare a range of cumulative deprivation measures: it is 
thus not necessary to provide a complete poverty profile. This analysis focuses on a number of 
characteristics  that  are  typically  associated  with  a  higher  risk  of  income  poverty:  single 
parenthood, households with many children (three or more), low work intensity households (the 
extent to which adult household members are working), an unemployment spell experienced by 
the parents in the past year, both parents are born abroad, low education (neither parent has post-
secondary education) and living in a rented dwelling.
20  
 
We are interested in finding out whether these high risk income poverty characteristics are also 
associated  with  an  increased  risk  of  cumulative  deprivation:  single  parenthood,  low  work 
intensity, an unemployment spell and rented accommodation are high risk characteristics  for 
every measure in every country including income poverty. Parents born abroad  represent  a 
somewhat higher risk according to some cumulative deprivation measures in some countries; in 
all countries such households are at risk of income poverty. In most c ases, no post-secondary 
education or a large number of children are not high risk characteristics.  
 
Relative to other French families with high risk characteristics, French children living in a low 
work intensity household have by far the highest chance o f income poverty and cumulative 
deprivation. The relative risk of income poverty, however, is much larger  than those of the 
cumulative deprivation measures (triple rather than double the average deprivation rate). For 
high risk characteristics in the other  countries, the relative risk of income poverty also seems 
considerably higher than that of the cumulative deprivation measures. Interestingly, in the 
Netherlands this phenomenon not only occurs for income poverty but also for the other relative 
measures (RCDI and RCDH). Without further investigation is not possible to say whether this 
feature can be explained predominantly by methodological  factors
21  or by real differences 
between the income and cumulative deprivation distributions.  
 
In sum, this section has shown that the levels of cumulative deprivation vary considerably among 
one another (especially between headcount and adjusted-headcount measures) and with income 
                                                 
 
20 Table A3 in the appendix summarizes the population shares for each of these groups. 
21 For instance, in this paper the equivalence scales used for the income poverty and the cumulative deprivation 
measures are different. To calculate income poverty, household income is adjusted with the modified OECD 
equivalence scales which assume that an additional adult member will only require 50% more of the resources than 
a single adult household while children require only 30% extra resources. To calculate cumulative deprivation we 
use household level indicators and do not make any adjustments with respect to the size of the household; this means 
that no extra resources are required for larger families. In practise, larger households are likely to have more 
resources than smaller households, but it is a priori not clear whether this will make them more or less likely to be 
deprived at an indicator level and a cumulative deprivation level. Car or computer ownership might be more likely 
while the larger family might be more likely to have an overcrowded dwelling or have (more) trouble financing a 
family vacation.      25 
 
poverty. Country rankings appear relatively stable as do the high risk poverty characteristics of 
single parenthood, low work intensity, unemployment spells and rented dwelling. Nevertheless, 
differences were found in other high risk characteristics and in the relative risk between income 
poverty and (some of the) cumulative deprivation measures. 
 
6. CUMULATIVE DEPRIVATION MEASURES:  
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
An effective welfare measure must be able to track changes in levels of well-being over time and 
between groups i.e. it needs to be responsive. However, a measure whose estimates are highly 
sensitive to even small adjustments in the construction methodology is problematic, particularly 
if those adjustments lead to inconsistencies in the interpretation of the results. For instance, an 
improvement  in  welfare  is  not  picked  up  by  the  measure,  or  rankings  between  groups  or 
countries are reversed. So, while the cumulative deprivation measure must have that first type of 
responsiveness, we should also test how these measures perform in terms of the latter type of 
responsiveness. Here, we revisit the key methodological decisions we took in section 4; we re-
estimate the cumulative deprivation measures under a number of realistic alternative decision 
scenarios; and we analyze the degree to which this would change the results. The sensitivity 
analyses will focus on i) changes in the indicator thresholds, ii) the exclusion of indicators from 
the cumulative deprivation measure, iii) changes in the cumulative deprivation threshold and iv) 
changes in the weighting of indicators. Thereafter, the findings from each sensitivity test are 
compared to find out which cumulative deprivation measure has the best overall performance.     
 
Sensitivity to indicator thresholds  
 
While most of the deprivation indicators in the EU-SILC are binominal, a household is either 
deprived or not, we could have chosen a different deprivation threshold for four of the indicators: 
overcrowding, access to school, access to primary health care and the ability to make ends meet. 
For all four indicators it is possible to choose a more stringent deprivation threshold: we re-
estimate  the  cumulative  deprivation  measures  by  simultaneously  using  a  more  stringent 
deprivation threshold for all four indicators.  
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Figure  6:  Deprivation  indicator  thresholds:  impact  on  cumulative  deprivation  indices 
 
Source: authors‟ calculations with EU-SILC, wave 2007. Estimates take account of the survey sampling design  
Notes:  This  figure  shows  the  impact  using  simultaneously  the  more  stringent  threshold  for  four  deprivation 
indicators: access to primary health care, access to compulsory school, ability to make ends meet and overcrowding. 
In each sub-graph the countries are ranked in increasing order of their outcome in the default deprivation measure. 
   





















































In the case of overcrowding our benchmark threshold states that there should be enough rooms in the 
dwelling so that every couple, single adult, two children under age 12, two same-sex children between 
age 12 and 17 can have their own room.
22 One possibility for a more restrictive criterion would be to 
argue that it would also be acceptable to have two teenagers of different gender sharing a room. For the 
other three variables a more stringent threshold is to consider only those deprived households that respond 
it is 'very difficult' to have access to basic services and to make ends meet , rather than also including 
households responding that it is 'difficult'. 
 
The results of the sensitivity test are summarized in Figure 6: in each sub-graph the countries are 
ranked  in  increasing  order  of  their  outcome  in  the  default  deprivation  measure.  Using  more 
stringent indicator thresholds means that some children are now not considered deprived in one or several 
indicators and one would thus expect that the cumulative deprivation measures should decline. That is 
indeed  the  general  pattern  that  occurs  for  most  cumulative  deprivation  measures,  though  with  one 
important exception.
23 For the Netherlands the RCDH shows a large increase rather than a decline (from 
28% of Dutch children to 48%). How is this possible? By making some of the indicator deprivation 
thresholds  more  stringent,  fewer  Dutch  children  are  indicator  deprived  and  this  also  affects  the 
distribution cumulative deprivation: rather than a median number of deprivations of one, the median 
Dutch child does not have any deprivation. As a result, the relative cumulative deprivation declines from 
1.5 (thus ≥ 2) to 0.5 (thus ≥ 1) and thus now also single deprived children are counted: according to the 
RCDH the Netherlands are now performing worst of all. Though the sensitivity of the estimates is much 
smaller, being a relative measure, the RCDI shows similar behaviour: though there is no country rank 
reversal for the RCDI, the estimate of the Netherlands increases from 0.063 to 0.066 while it decreases for 
all the other countries. We further discuss the desirability of this phenomenon at the end of this section 
but from the above discussion it is clear that we could expect the relative deprivation measures to show 
similar behaviour in the other sensitivity tests.  
 
Sensitivity to the exclusion of deprivation indicators  
 
Ideally, we would have liked to have information on other aspects of children's well-being and 
well-becoming but the data constrained this choice: we selected 13 indicators because these were 
the  only  ones  that  could  be  constructed  and  that  passed  our  selection  criteria.  Including  or 
excluding indicators will impact the cumulative deprivation measures but a priori it is not clear 
in  which direction this will influence the estimates. Firstly, the rate of indicator deprivation 
determines the effective weight that this indicator has in determining the value of the cumulative 
deprivation measures: an indicator that has a high percentage of deprived children will make a 
larger contribution to the cumulative deprivation measure than one for which the percentage of 
deprived  is  much  smaller.  Secondly,  all  CDI  measures  measure  the  number  of  experienced 
deprivations relative to that of the total experienced deprivations; excluding an indicator reduces 
                                                 
 
22 It should be noted that the survey does not provide information about which household members actually share a 
room. This deprivation indicator is created by using household information such as age, gender, relationship and the 
number of rooms in the dwelling. 
23 Germany and France also switch ranks for the RCDH but this is because their cumulative deprivation levels are 
very close and a small change could easily lead to a rank reversal. 28 
 
the amount in the denominator while adding another indicator will increase it (see equation 1 in 
section  3).  Thirdly,  the  relative  cumulative  deprivation  threshold  may  change  as  a  result  of 
adding or excluding an indicator.  
 
Figures 7 to 10 show how much the estimates will change by excluding one of the indicators at a 
time. The CDI and CDI of the poor estimates (Figures 7 and 8) either increase or decrease: the 
exclusion of the high incidence indicators such as inability to afford a one week vacation reduces 
the estimates while the exclusion of a lower incidence indicators, such as inability to afford a car 
increases it. Though the estimates are clearly affected, the difference between the highest and 
lowest estimate is not very large with an order of about 0.02 for the CDI and 0.035 for the CDI 
of the poor (see Table A5 in the appendix). The country rankings are rather robust for the CDI:
24 
out  of  13  different  CDI  scenarios,  rankings   change  for  2  indicators  (experienced 
crime/violence/vandalism, and ability to make ends meet). For the CDI of the poor the UK now 
regularly performs somewhat better than France and in one case Germany performs worst of all 
countries (ability to make ends meet).  
 
The relative measures are displayed in Figures 9 (RCDI) and 10 (RCDH). In four of the 13 cases, 
the exclusion of an indicator triggers a change in the cumulative deprivation threshold in the 
Netherlands resulting in a large increase in the relative measures, especially in comparison to the 






   
                                                 
 
24 Figures 7-10 give a 'within-country' perspective; a reversal in ranking is much easier to spot in a figure that 
provides a 'between-country' perspective. We can make the 'between-country' perspective available on request.   29 
 
Figure 7: Exclusion of deprivation indicators: impact on CDI 
 
 
Figure 8: Exclusion of deprivation indicators: impact on CDI of the poor  
 
 




































































Cumulative Deprivation Index (CDI)




































































Cumulative Deprivation Index (CDI of the poor)30 
 
Figure 9: Exclusion of deprivation indicators: impact on RCDI 
 
Figure 10: Exclusion of deprivation indicators: impact on RCDH  
 
Sensitivity to cumulative deprivation thresholds 




































































Relative Cumulative Deprivation Index (RCDI)




































































Relative Cumulative Deprivation Headcount (RCDH)31 
 
 
For the CDI and the CDI of the poor our default cumulative deprivation threshold is one because 
it makes the interpretation of the estimate more intuitive i.e. one can interpret the estimates as the 
average percentage of experienced deprivations by the population or the poor. For the relative 
indicators  the  cumulative  deprivation  threshold  is  distribution  dependent  but  we  could  still 
change the fraction (k) that determines when the number of deprivations is unacceptably large in 
comparison to what is typical in that country. Thus, irrespective of the approach, the cumulative 
deprivation threshold can lie at one or more deprivations. In the poverty measurement literature 
this choice is also known as the choice between a union (k=1), dual cut-off (2 ≥ k ≤ 12) and 
intersection (k=13) approach (see for instance Alkire & Santos, 2009, p. 143). Union and dual 
cut-off approaches are more prevalent than intersection approaches; a person does not need to be 
deprived  in  all  dimensions  or  indicators  before  she  is  considered  multi-dimensionally  or 
cumulatively  deprived.  Moreover,  in  our  case  an  intersection  approach  would  yield  no 
cumulative deprivation in any of the four countries as none of the children live in households 
experiencing all 13 deprivations; in fact, very few children experience 5 or more deprivations 
(see Table 5). We therefore limit the sensitivity test to cut-offs 1 to 4 which we estimate for the 
CDI,  CDI  of  the  poor  and  the  Cumulative  Deprivation  Headcount  (CDH).  The  results  are 
displayed in Figures 11 to 13.   
 
































Cumulative Deprivation Index (CDI)32 
 
Figure 12: Cumulative deprivation threshold: impact on CDI of the poor  
 
Figure 13: Cumulative deprivation threshold: impact on CDH
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Cumulative Deprivation Headcount (CDH)33 
 
As  the  cumulative  deprivation  threshold  becomes  higher,  fewer  children  will  be  considered 
deprived even though they might experience deprivation in some indicators. As a result, the CDI 
and  CDH  measures  will  decline  as  the  cumulative  deprivation  threshold  increases  (fewer 
children are included in the numerator while the child population in the denominator will stay 
constant) while the CDI of the poor will increase (only the poorest children are included in both 
numerator and denominator). The spread in estimates between the highest and lowest threshold is 
high for all measures; a change in the cumulative deprivation measure has a very large impact 
(the indices double or triple in value). In spite of this high sensitivity in levels, for the CDI and 
CDI of the poor a simultaneous change in threshold for all countries does not influence the 
ranking; for the CDH Germany and France switch ranks for k=2.   
 
Sensitivity to weighting indicators 
 
Our  benchmark  estimates  give  an  equal  weight  to  each  of  the  indicators  in  the  cumulative 
deprivation measure: there are 13 indicators, so each of them has a weight of 0.077 (1/13). In 
section four we identified two alternatives, of which the frequency weights method is the only 
one  that  can  be  tested  with  this  selection  of  indicators.  Frequency  weights  depend  on  the 
proportion of non-deprived people over the total population; the weight is lower if deprivation 
rates are higher and vice versa. Under the frequency weighting scheme the indicator weight now 
varies from 0.059 for the holiday indicator to 0.085 for the car indicator (see Table A4 in the 
appendix  for  a  complete  summary  of  the  changes  in  weights  for  every  indicator  in  every 
country).
25 As the incidence of deprivation differs between the population as a whole and the 
child population, we have calculated frequency weights based on the deprivation incidence of the 
total population as well as that of the total child population.   
 
Table 6 summarizes the results: the CDI, CDI of the poor and the RCDI are slightly lower under 
a  frequency  weighting  scheme;  they  are  exactly  the  same for  the RCDH.  These  findings 
correspond with those found by Guio (2009, p. 21) who finds that frequency weights have little 
impact on countries with relatively low deprivation rates; indicator weights under the frequency 
method are not very different from that of an equal weighting scheme. For countries with higher 
deprivation rates, the difference becomes larger: the weights of prevalent dep rivation indicators 
decline  thus  reducing  the  estimates  under  a  frequency -based  weighting  scheme.  From  an 
international comparative perspective, this means that the differences in cumulative deprivation 




                                                 
 
25 We calculate the weights as proposed in Guio (2009, p. 14). 
26 Guio (2009, p. 21) also tests the impact of consensus weights which are dependent on the average public opinion 
regarding the necessity of items (if more people find the item a necessity, the weight increases): her findings suggest 
that consensus weights typically yield estimates below those of equal weights but above those of frequency weights. 34 
 
Table 6: Cumulative deprivation measures under various weighting schemes 
  Equal weights  Frequency weights 
    Population  Children 
  CDI 
DE  0.120  0.115  0.114 
FR  0.126  0.120  0.119 
NL  0.085  0.082  0.081 
UK  0.131  0.125  0.123 
  CDI of the poor 
       
DE  0.181  0.174  0.172 
FR  0.193  0.183  0.182 
NL  0.149  0.142  0.142 
UK  0.191  0.182  0.179 
  RCDI 
DE  0.100  0.097  0.096 
FR  0.106  0.101  0.101 
NL  0.063  0.060  0.060 
UK  0.110  0.106  0.104 
  RCDH 
DE  0.408  0.408  0.408 
FR  0.402  0.402  0.402 
NL  0.275  0.275  0.275 
UK  0.417  0.417  0.417 
 
 
Summing up the sensitivity analyses: so what's the real confidence interval? 
 
We  have  tested  and  analyzed  the  sensitivity  of  the  four  candidates  for  an  EU  cumulative 
deprivation measure with respect to indicator thresholds, the exclusion of indicators, cumulative 
deprivation thresholds, and weighting schemes. Though we separately tested for each aspect the 
impact of one or several reasonably alternative choices, we did not exhaust all possible options: 
we could have tested more extreme choices (such as a cumulative deprivation threshold of 5 or 6 
or the exclusion of several indicators at a time) and we could have tested the joint impact of 
changing several aspects at the same time (such as a change in cumulative threshold and the 
exclusion of an indicator). In spite of this, the tests have deepened our understanding of how 
each of these methodological choices affects the empirical behaviour of each measure. Now it is 
time  to  synthesize  these  test  results  and  answer  the  question:  what  do  they  mean  for  the 
suitability of the proposed measures and their relevance in both national and EU policy making 
contexts?  One  could  interpret  the  range  of  estimates  in  this  section  as  the  'real'  confidence 35 
 
interval i.e. the range within which one can reasonably expect to find an estimate of a cumulative 
deprivation measure. As with statistical confidence intervals, a wider confidence interval means 
less precision and thus an increased likelihood that differences between groups (be they countries 
or subgroups in the population) are either not consistent or insignificant. A wide confidence 
interval makes the measure less reliable and thus less useful for policy makers: Does group A 
really  need  more  attention  than  group  B?  Is  country  C  indeed  more  successful  in  reducing 
cumulative deprivation than country D? In sum, a cumulative measure that comes out of the 
sensitivity tests with a narrower range and more consistency in country and subgroup rankings is 
thus a more reliable measure.       
          Table 7: Maximum range of point estimates over all sensitivity tests 
Country  Measure  Point estimates 
    Minimum  Benchmark  Maximum 
DE  CDI  0.049  0.120  0.128 
  CDI_poor  0.074  0.181  0.387 
  RCDI  0.082  0.100  0.107 
  RCDH  0.317  0.408  0.408 
  CDH  0.127  no default       0.660 
FR  CDI  0.060  0.126  0.133 
  CDI_poor  0.081  0.193  0.397 
  RCDI  0.087  0.106  0.112 
  RCDH  0.329  0.402  0.402 
  CDH  0.151  no default  0.652 
NL  CDI  0.026  0.085  0.092 
  CDI_poor  0.066  0.149  0.374 
  RCDI  0.055  0.063  0.085 
  RCDH  0.240  0.275  0.539 
  CDH  0.070  no default  0.572 
UK  CDI  0.062  0.131  0.138 
  CDI_poor  0.087  0.191  0.396 
  RCDI  0.093  0.110  0.115 
  RCDH  0.353  0.417  0.417 
  CDH  0.156  no default  0.686 
 
Table 7 shows the 'confidence interval' by summarizing for each measure the highest and lowest 
estimate  from  all  sensitivity  tests  as  well  as  the  benchmark  estimate.  For  instance,  in  our 
sensitivity tests the CDI estimates for Germany range from 0.049 to 0.128. Table A5 in the 
appendix does  the same but  then for each of the sensitivity tests  separately: the 0.049 CDI 
estimate  occurred  when  testing  the  cumulative  deprivation  threshold  and  the  0.128  value 
occurred when testing the exclusion of deprivation indicators. Table 8, finally, summarizes how 
each  test  influenced  the  international  ranking  of  these  countries  from  lowest  to  highest 36 
 
cumulative deprivation levels: the country ranking does not change for the minimum, benchmark 
and maximum estimates of the CDI. This does not necessarily mean that the ranking is stable 
across the whole interval; countries can still leap frog one another for other values.  
 
The CDI values differ between the tested alternatives but they vary over a rather narrow range 
and the country rankings are relatively stable. For the CDI of the poor the range is much broader 
but  the  country  rankings  are  also  relatively  stable:  Table  A5  shows  that  the  estimates  are 
especially  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  cumulative  deprivation  threshold  but  are  much  less 
sensitive to changes in other parts of the methodology. The range of RCDI values and country 
rankings are very similar to those of the CDI but the analysis in previous sub-sections has shown 
that  a  small  change  in  methodology  lead  to  a  considerable  change  in  the  estimate  for  the 
Netherlands (in comparison to other countries). The range of both headcount measures (RCDH 
and CDH) is very large and, in one case, an extreme reversal in country ranking occurs.  
 
As explained earlier in this section, underlying this behaviour of the relative measures is the 
distribution dependent cumulative deprivation threshold: a slight change in the methodology can 
change the median number of deprivations and thus the cumulative threshold but to what extent 
is this problematic? If we take a relative perspective on welfare and it is agreed that we care 
about inequalities between residents, then it makes sense that we choose a national, distribution-
dependent threshold to compare residents of the same country. An improvement in the overall 
well-being  thus  represents  a  valid  reason  for  adjusting  the  relative  standard  of  cumulative 
deprivation; if deprivation becomes less common in a society, those who are still deprived are 
now relatively worse off. In that sense, the  cumulative deprivation measure should show an 
increase.
27  The problem is that any welfare changes, be they real or due to methodological 
changes, could lead to very large changes in estimates. As the cumulative deprivation measure 
will be used to monitor changes over time and between countries, this is a serious  defect. In an 
EU context with 27 member states, a change in the relative cumulative deprivation threshold 
would lead to frequent and considerable rank reversals. Moreover, some of the EU member 
states are seeing rapid change in their living standards; the ir relative cumulative deprivation 
indices are thus more likely to show disproportionately large jumps from one year to another, 
especially in comparison to the actual change in living standards. Be it for national or cross -
national comparative policy purp oses, this is not a desirable characteristic of a cumulative 
deprivation measure. 
                                                 
 
27 Guio (2009, p. 22) also tests a relative cumulative deprivation headcount by setting the threshold at 300% of the 
average deprivation and finds that the most deprived countries have the lowest rates and vice versa for the least 
deprived countries. She argues that a relative measure occults the 'absolute' nature of deprivation.  37 
 
Table 8: Summary sensitivity tests: impact on country rankings 
   
Germany  France  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
   
Min  Def  Max  Min  Def  Max  Min  Def  Max  Min  Def  Max 
CDI  Indicator threshold  2  2  NC  3  3  NC  1  1  NC  4  4  NC 
 
Exclusion indicator  2  2  2  3  3  3  1  1  1  4  4  4 
 
Cum. deprivation threshold  2  2  2  3  3  3  1  1  1  4  4  4 
 
Indicator weights  2  2  2  3  3  3  1  1  1  4  4  4 
CDI_poor  Indicator threshold  2  2  NC  3  4  NC  1  1  NC  4  3  NC 
 
Exclusion indicator  2  2  2  3  4  4  1  1  1  4  3  3 
 
Cum. deprivation threshold  2  2  2  4  4  4  1  1  1  3  3  3 
 
Indicator weights  2  2  2  4  4  4  1  1  1  3  3  3 
RCDI  Indicator threshold  2  2  NC  3  3  NC  NC  1  1  4  4  NC 
 
Exclusion indicator  2  2  2  3  3  3  1  1  1  4  4  4 
 
Cum. deprivation threshold  NC  2  NC  NC  3  NC  NC  1  NC  NC  4  NC 
 
Indicator weights  2  2  2  3  3  3  1  1  1  4  4  4 
RCDH  Indicator threshold  1  3  NC  2  2  NC  NC  1  4  3  4  NC 
 
Exclusion indicator  2  3  2  2  2  1  1  1  4  4  4  3 
 
Cum. deprivation threshold  NC  3  NC  NC  2  NC  NC  1  NC  NC  4  NC 
 
Indicator weights  3  3  3  2  2  2  1  1  1  4  4  4 
CDH  Cum. deprivation threshold  2  NC  3  3  NC  2  1  NC  1  4  NC  4 






In the light of the current search for child sensitive social indicators in the European Union, this 
paper compared potential candidate measures of cumulative deprivation. The aim was to find a 
measure that is able to capture changes in the breadth of deprivations (i.e. the degree to which a 
child is experiencing multiple deprivations) and that has an intuitive interpretation. Section 2 
examined the role of social indicators in the EU context and showed that the development of 
child focused indicators substantially lags behind that of population based indicators of poverty 
and  social  inclusion.  Recent  efforts  have  proposed  a  wide  range  of  child  specific  single 
indicators but only one, not child specific, composite indicator has been proposed and adopted. 
Drawing  from  the  multidimensional  poverty  measurement  literature,  section  3  subsequently 
discussed  potential  measures,  their  calculation  and  their  theoretical  properties  and  four 
candidates were retained for the empirical analysis. Section 4 set out our choices regarding the 
operationalisation of the measures with the 2007 wave of the EU-SILC. While the data were the 
best  choice  available  it  constrained  our  choices:  all  selected  indicators  are  household  level 
indicators,  no  relevant  child  specific  indicators  were  available;  while  the  indicators  cover 
domains such as  financial deprivation, housing, neighbourhood and access to basic services, 
there  is  no  relevant  information  on  domains  such  as  children's  health,  education  and  social 
relations. Section 5 analyzed and compared the benchmark estimates. It showed that cumulative 
deprivation levels differ considerably among the measures (especially between headcount and 
adjusted-headcount  measures)  and  with  income  poverty.  Country  rankings  appear  relatively 
stable across measures as do the high risk poverty characteristics of single parenthood, low work 
intensity, unemployment spells and rented dwelling. Nevertheless, differences  were found in 
other high risk characteristics and in the relative risk between income poverty and (some of the) 
cumulative deprivation measures. Section 6 interpreted and discussed the results from a battery 
of sensitivity analyses: though each sensitivity test impacted the estimates, some measures were 
found to be considerably more sensitive than others. The Cumulative Deprivation Index (CDI) 
measure performed well: while estimates differed between the alternatives tested, they varied 
over a rather narrow range and the country rankings were also relatively stable. The CDI of the 
poor generally performed well but it was very sensitive to changes in the cumulative deprivation 
threshold. The two relative measures, the Relative CDI (RCDI) and the Relative Cumulative 
Deprivation  Headcount  (RCDH),  were  more  problematic:  relatively  minor  changes  in  the 
methodology could lead to very large changes in estimates and lead in one case to an extreme 
reversal  in  ranking;  moreover,  a  small  change  in  'real'  welfare  could  have  a  similarly  large 
impact.  
 
While currently the only measure of cumulative deprivation in the EU is a headcount measure 
(TARKI  Social  Research  Institute,  2010),  our  findings  show  that  the  CDI  has  a  number  of 
advantages  as  a measure of cumulative deprivation thus  making it a good complement to  a 
headcount measure. Firstly, unlike all headcount measures, the CDI is sensitive to changes in the 39 
 
breadth of deprivation. Secondly, if the cumulative deprivation threshold is set at one, thus also 
counting single deprived children, the values are easily interpreted as the average percentage of 
deprivations experienced by children. Thirdly, it is also not over-sensitive to small changes in the 
methodology  or  welfare.  The  CDI  of  the  poor  could  also  be  an  interesting  complementary 
indicator as it focuses only on deprived children, especially when the cumulative deprivation 
threshold is also set at one deprivation. Measures that use a relative deprivation threshold are not 
recommended because the estimates are over-sensitive to changes in welfare and methodology. 
Instead,  a  potentially  more  promising  way  to  take  account  of  cross-national  differences  in 
deprivation  levels  would  be  to  further  investigate  the  use  of  either  prevalence  weights  or 
consensus weights in determining the relative weight of each indicator in the composite measure. 
This, however, would come at the loss of intuitive interpretation of the estimates.  
 
These conclusions are relevant beyond the context of the present EU discussion on child specific 
indicators; they also contribute to our understanding of multidimensional poverty measures and 
their  potential  to  contribute  to  making  better  policy  decisions.  Firstly,  while  stochastic 
dominance tests are relatively easy to perform for a single income poverty indicator, performing 
similar tests for composite indicators constructed out of non-continuous single indicators is not 
only much more challenging but it is also considerably less likely to yield useful information for 
policymakers as the range over which 'dominance' can be established becomes much narrower. 
Secondly, while using a relative income poverty line often makes a lot of sense in international 
poverty comparisons, this research shows that setting a relative cumulative deprivation threshold 
leads to over-sensitivity in the estimates due to discontinuities in the indicator and cumulative 
deprivation distributions.   
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Table A1: Correlation between deprivation indicators (only displayed if significant ≤ 5%) 
Germany (DE) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
1  1.00                         
2  0.19  1.00                       
3  0.09  0.10  1.00                     
4  0.06  0.07  0.04  1.00                   
5  0.11  0.12  0.08  0.33  1.00                 
6  0.07  0.03  -0.03      1.00               
7  0.08  0.05        0.34  1.00             
8  0.12  0.24  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.04             1.00           
9  0.18  0.27  0.15  0.04  0.10  0.07  0.07  0.25  1.00         
10  0.10  0.31  0.14  0.05  0.12  0.06  0.09  0.19  0.31  1.00       
11  0.04  0.14  0.11    0.05  0.03             0.08  0.16  0.18  1.00     
12  0.06  0.17  0.13  0.06  0.12               0.17  0.20  0.19  0.31  1.00   
13  0.13  0.28  0.09  0.04  0.08  0.03  0.07  0.25  0.29  0.28  0.11  0.14  1.00 
France (FR) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
1  1.00                         
2  0.14  1.00                       
3  0.15  0.08  1.00                     
4  0.11  0.11  0.11  1.00                   
5  0.12  0.09  0.11  0.26  1.00                 
6        0.04  0.03  1.00               
7  0.06  0.03      0.05  0.05  1.00             
8  0.16  0.19  0.16  0.10  0.11               1.00           
9  0.19  0.22  0.21  0.10  0.13  0.03  0.03  0.33  1.00         
10  0.10  0.29  0.18  0.09  0.11               0.26  0.28  1.00       
11  0.11  0.15  0.16  0.10  0.11               0.23  0.27  0.21  1.00     
12  0.11  0.06  0.12  0.11  0.07               0.19  0.19  0.16  0.21  1.00   
13  0.16  0.26  0.23  0.15  0.13  0.06  0.04  0.43  0.50  0.33  0.30  0.19  1.00 
1: Dwelling has leaking roof, damp walls/floors/foundation, or rot in window frames or floor 
2: Dwelling is not comfortably warm during winter time 
3: Dwelling is overcrowded  
4: Pollution, grime or other environmental problems 
5: Crime violence or vandalism in the area 
6: Accessibility of primary health care services 
7: Accessibility of compulsory school 
8: Household has payment arrears on mortgage/rent, utility bills, instalments/loan payments 
9: Household cannot afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every 2nd day 
10: Household cannot afford paying for one week annual holiday away from home 
11: Household cannot afford a computer for financial reasons 
12: Household cannot afford a car for financial reasons 
13: Ability to make ends meet (very difficult) 45 
 
Table A2: Correlation between deprivation indicators (only displayed if significant ≤ 5%) 
The Netherlands (NL) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
1  1.00                         
2  0.12  1.00                       
3    0.04  1.00                     
4  0.08  0.04  -0.03  1.00                   
5  0.08  0.03    0.13  1.00                 
6  0.03  0.04    0.06  0.03  1.00               
7    0.04  -0.04  0.06    0.14  1.00             
8  0.07  0.14      0.05    0.04  1.00           
9  0.12  0.30  0.04  0.06  0.06  0.04  0.08  0.30  1.00         
10    0.27        0.06             0.09  0.14  1.00       
11  0.06  0.05    0.03  0.06               0.12  0.10    1.00     
12  0.09  0.19  0.08  0.03  0.05  0.03             0.18  0.30  0.12  0.11  1.00   
13  0.12  0.27  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.07  0.23  0.46  0.14  0.10  0.26  1.00 
United Kingdom (UK) 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13 
1  1.00                         
2  0.11  1.00                       
3  0.09  0.09  1.00                     
4  0.10      1.00                   
5  0.09    0.04  0.16  1.00                 
6  0.09  0.10  0.06  0.06  0.04  1.00               
7  0.04  0.03  0.05  0.06  0.10  0.08  1.00             
8  0.18  0.10  0.11  0.05  0.12  0.06  0.08  1.00           
9  0.20  0.21  0.18  0.06  0.10  0.11  0.03  0.38  1.00         
10    0.29  0.12  0.04  0.04               0.21  0.28  1.00       
11  0.06  0.07  0.10  0.05  0.04  0.06  0.03  0.20  0.24  0.13  1.00     
12  0.11  0.11  0.14    0.06  0.04             0.21  0.29  0.17  0.22  1.00   
13  0.12  0.22  0.14  0.05  0.09  0.13  0.08  0.35  0.42  0.22  0.17  0.21  1.00 
1: Dwelling has leaking roof, damp walls/floors/foundation, or rot in window frames or floor 
2: Dwelling is not comfortably warm during winter time 
3: Dwelling is overcrowded  
4: Pollution, grime or other environmental problems 
5: Crime violence or vandalism in the area 
6: Accessibility of primary health care services 
7: Accessibility of compulsory school 
8: Household has payment arrears on mortgage/rent, utility bills, instalments/loan payments 
9: Household cannot afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every 2nd day 
10: Household cannot afford paying for one week annual holiday away from home 
11: Household cannot afford a computer for financial reasons 
12: Household cannot afford a car for financial reasons 
13: Ability to make ends meet (very difficult) 46 
 
Notes on Table A1 and A2: 
 
Tables A1 and A2 summarize the pair wise correlations between the indicators: higher positive 
correlations are a first indication of a higher likelihood of double deprivation. The correlations 
are generally significant and positive; higher correlations can be found between 'make ends meet' 
and some of the other financial strain indicators; France has much higher correlations than the 
other countries; correlations in the Netherlands are generally lower; in France and Germany the 
correlation  between  the  neighbourhood  variables  is  considerably  higher  than  that  in  the 
Netherlands and the UK; Germany has a higher correlation between the two access variables but 




Table A3: Population shares of high poverty risk children (as a % of all children) 
  DE  FR  NL  UK 
Single parent household, at least 1 dependent child  14.0  12.1  10.1  18.2 
Two adults, 3 or more dependent children  22.7  28.2  31.8  20.5 
Low work intensity household  11.3  10.9  9.4  17.8 
At least one parent had unemployment spell last year  13.7  18.0  11.6  6.0 
Both parents were born in foreign country  9.9  20.4  10.8  18.6 
Both parents have no post-secondary education  25.5  29.6  40.8  40.1 
Household lives in rented dwelling  37.3  36.5  22.5  30.5 47 
 
Table A4: Indicator weights under various weighting schemes 
Weighting scheme  Equal   Frequency  
    National population  National child population 
Indicator  All  DE  FR  NL  UK  DE  FR  NL  UK 
                   
leaks/damp present in house  0.077  0.075  0.074  0.068  0.073  0.073  0.074  0.067  0.073 
unable to keep house warm  0.077  0.081  0.082  0.082  0.082  0.082  0.084  0.083  0.084 
overcrowding  0.077  0.080  0.077  0.081  0.080  0.079  0.075  0.080  0.078 
experienced pollution / environmental problems  0.077  0.067  0.072  0.072  0.074  0.069  0.074  0.073  0.077 
experienced crime / violence / vandalism  0.077  0.075  0.072  0.069  0.062  0.077  0.074  0.069  0.063 
difficult to access primary health care  0.077  0.076  0.081  0.076  0.080  0.076  0.081  0.077  0.084 
difficult to access compulsory school  0.077  0.077  0.084  0.081  0.083  0.073  0.082  0.078  0.081 
combined arrears indicator  0.077  0.081  0.078  0.080  0.078  0.081  0.077  0.080  0.076 
not able to afford holiday  0.077  0.065  0.060  0.072  0.067  0.061  0.059  0.073  0.062 
cannot afford meat etc every second day  0.077  0.077  0.081  0.082  0.082  0.078  0.082  0.083  0.084 
cannot afford a computer  0.077  0.083  0.081  0.082  0.082  0.085  0.082  0.084  0.084 
cannot afford a car  0.077  0.082  0.084  0.079  0.081  0.084  0.085  0.080  0.083 
difficult to make ends meet  0.077  0.081  0.073  0.075  0.074  0.082  0.070  0.074  0.071 
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Table A5: Summary sensitivity tests: range of point estimates 
   
Germany  France  Netherlands  United Kingdom 
   
Min  Def  Max  Min  Def  Max  Min  Def  Max  Min  Def  Max 
CDI  All sensitivity tests  0.049  0.12  0.128  0.06  0.126  0.133  0.026  0.085  0.092  0.062  0.131  0.138 
 
Indicator threshold  0.094  0.12  NC  0.101  0.126  NC  0.066  0.085  NC  0.108  0.131  NC 
 
Exclusion indicator  0.105  0.12  0.128  0.109  0.126  0.133  0.076  0.085  0.092  0.117  0.131  0.138 
 
Cum. depr. threshold  0.049  0.12  0.12  0.06  0.126  0.126  0.026  0.085  0.085  0.062  0.131  0.131 
 
Indicator weights  0.114  0.12  0.12  0.119  0.126  0.126  0.081  0.085  0.085  0.123  0.131  0.131 
CDI_poor  All sensitivity tests  0.074  0.181  0.387  0.081  0.193  0.397  0.066  0.149  0.374  0.087  0.191  0.396 
 
Indicator threshold  0.142  0.181  NC  0.155  0.193  NC  0.116  0.149  NC  0.158  0.191  NC 
 
Exclusion indicator  0.158  0.181  0.194  0.167  0.193  0.204  0.132  0.149  0.161  0.17  0.191  0.201 
 
Cum. depr. threshold  0.181  0.181  0.387  0.193  0.193  0.397  0.149  0.149  0.374  0.191  0.191  0.396 
 
Indicator weights  0.172  0.181  0.181  0.182  0.193  0.193  0.142  0.149  0.149  0.179  0.191  0.191 
RCDI  All sensitivity tests  0.082  0.1  0.107  0.087  0.106  0.112  0.055  0.063  0.085  0.093  0.11  0.115 
 
Indicator threshold  0.074  0.1  NC  0.081  0.106  NC  NC  0.063  0.066  0.087  0.11  NC 
 
Exclusion indicator  0.082  0.1  0.107  0.087  0.106  0.112  0.055  0.063  0.085  0.093  0.11  0.115 
 
Cum. depr. threshold  NC  0.1  NC  NC  0.106  NC  NC  0.063  NC  NC  0.11  NC 
 
Indicator weights  0.096  0.1  0.1  0.101  0.106  0.106  0.06  0.063  0.063  0.104  0.11  0.11 
RCDH  All sensitivity tests  0.317  0.408  0.408  0.329  0.402  0.402  0.24  0.275  0.539  0.353  0.417  0.417 
 
Indicator threshold  0.317  0.408  NC  0.329  0.402  NC  NC  0.275  0.477  0.477  0.417  NC 
 
Exclusion indicator  0.334  0.408  0.408  0.334  0.402  0.402  0.24  0.275  0.539  0.353  0.417  0.417 
 
Cum. depr. threshold  NC  0.408  NC  NC  0.402  NC  NC  0.275  NC  NC  0.417  NC 
 
Indicator weights  0.408  0.408  0.408  0.402  0.402  0.402  0.275  0.275  0.275  0.417  0.417  0.417 
CDH  Cum. depr. threshold  0.127  NC  0.66  0.151  NC  0.652  0.07  NC  0.572  0.156  NC  0.686 
Note: NC means not calculated 
 
 